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Computer / Internet
Chapter 218: Stopping Cybersquatters From Harming One of
California's Valuable Resources: Hollywood
Eric J. Moore
Code Sections Affected
Business and Professions Code §§ 17525, 17526, 17527, 17528 (new).
SB 1319 (Burton); 2000 STAT. Ch. 218
"Why do you want to fund your attorney's purchase of a new boat (or
whatever) when you can facilitate the acquisition of 'Panavision.com'
cheaply and simply instead?"'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Panavision attempted to register their website on the Internet, but
quickly found out that Mr. Dennis Toeppen had already registered the domain name
Panavision.com, along with over a hundred other marks.2 Upon Panavision's
request, Mr. Toeppen replied with a letter demanding payment for the
relinquishment of the web address. Fortunately for hundreds of other companies
who had yet to register their own domain names, Panavision did not pay the ransom
demanded by Mr. Toeppen.4 If the ransom had been paid, Mr. Toeppen could have
then used this result as a bargaining chip in future negotiations, potentially costing
many other businesses a significant sum, and earning Mr. Toeppen a windfall for his
early registration of their domain names . In this case, the court quickly saw through
1. See Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Mr. Toeppen's letter,
seeking $13,000, in response to Panavision's demand to cease and desist the use of their mark for his domain name).
2. See id. at 1319 (describing the sequence of events that led to litigation between the Panavision and Mr.
Toeppen); see also Steven R. Borgman, The New Federal Cybersquatting Laws, 8 rEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 265,266
(2000) (discussing Mr. Toeppen's infamous scheme where he registered several famous marks, including Delta
Airlines, Nieman Marcus, Eddie Bauer, Lufthansa, and many others).
3. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319.
4. Jeremy D. Mishkin, Master of Your Domain-An Overview of the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act, 18 CoMM. LAW 3, 4 (2000) (stating that Pantivision responded to Toeppen's offer by suing under
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act).
5. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327.
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Mr. Toeppen' s polite form of extortion and held in favor of Panavision, concluding
that Mr. Toeppen was diluting Panavision's registered trademark.6
With the seemingly infinite growth and economic possibilities now available
through the Internet,7 new laws are necessary to address the emerging legal issues.
8
Unfortunately, the problems produced by the Internet are compounded by the speed
at which the medium has been introduced and the lack of any true legal precedence
on the matter.9 This lack of legal history has left some courts struggling with how
to apply pre-Internet trademark laws to present day Internet trademark issues.' °
One novel problem related to the internet that has recently been addressed by
the federal government is cybersquatting." l A cybersquatter 2 is an individual who
collects domain names with the intent of selling the domain names to the person or
company, who owns the mark
3 or personal name. 14
While the federal government has drastically limited a cybersquatter's ability
to exact their particular brand of extortion, loopholes still remain open that are of
particular importance to the State of California.15 The Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (ACPA) does not provide protection for the estates of deceased
celebrities.16 In addition, the cybersquatter must specifically intend to profit from his
actions in order to be found guilty under the ACPA. 17
In an attempt to go beyond federal anti-cybersquatting legislation, the California
legislature enacted Chapter 218.18 Chapter 218 provides protection from an
6. Id.; see Malcolm Mayhew, Cyberjackers Heist Identities of Rich, Famous, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 2,
2000, at El (quoting Jeff Liles, Creative Director for Nvision, view of cybersquatters tactics are "almost extortion").
7. See FNC Resolution: Definition of "Internet," available at http://www.fnc.gov/Intemet-res.html (last
visited June 22, 2000) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (defining the Internet as a global information
system linked by unique address spaces, capable of supporting communications using Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), that can give access, either publicly or privately, to high level services layered
on a communications infrastructure).
8. Borgman, supra note 2, at 266.
9. Joshua Paul, Judicial Treatment of Trademarks in Cyberspace, 590 PLI/PAT. 271, 273 (2000).
10. Id.
11. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (d) (West Supp. 2000) (enacting a specific cause of action against
cybersquatters); see also Mayhew, supra note 6, at El (reporting on some specific examples of cybersquatting and
how celebrities are trying to deal with the problem); Borgman, supra note 2, at 266 (discussing the application and
ramifications of the ACPA).
12. See Jennifer Golinveaux, What's in a Domain Name: Is "Cybersquatting" Trademark Dilution?, 33
U.S.E L. REV. 641, 647 (defining a cybersquatter as "a speculator who knowingly reserves a trademark as a domain
name merely to sell it for a profit").
13. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West Supp. 2000) (defining a "mark" as including "any trademark, service
mark, collective mark, or certification mark").
14. Id. § 1125(d).
15. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings of the ACPA).
16. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1129 (1)(a) (West Supp. 2000) (providing a remedy against persons who register "the
name of another living person" exclusively).
17. Id.
18. See ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITIEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1319 at 3-5 (June 20, 2000)
(discussing specific "loopholes," such as the requirement of proof of commercial motivation, or the fact that
protection is limited only to valid trademark holders).
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individual who, with a bad faith intent, registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name
that is identical or confusingly similar to the personal name of another living person
or deceased personality.19
II. BACKGROUND
Put simply, the Internet is a collection of individual computers and computer
networks linked together, using a common standard of data transmission for
communication, enabling information to be shared with other users.20 Each computer
or computer network has its own individual numerical code, similar to a phone
number, that is unique to itself and enables all other members of the Internet to find
that specific computer or computer network.2 This numeric code is referred to as
an Internet Protocol (IP) address, usually in a form similar to "123.255.255.255. ,22
Since the numeric system is somewhat unruly, and because it is difficult for most
people to remember large strings of arbitrary numbers, the Internet developers allow
the assignment of an alphanumeric address to coincide with the IP address.23 These
alphanumeric addresses are commonly referred to as "domain names. 24 These
domain names are organized into a hierarchical structure. 5 At the top of the
hierarchy is the top-level domain (TLD) directory. TLD's are meant to act as an
identifier of the category of user who has registered the domain. 26 For example, in
"McGeorge.edu," the ".edu" identifies the user as an educational institute.
27
Similarly, in "Ox.ac.uk" and "U-Tokyo.acjp" the ".uk" and ".jp" work as country
identifiers. 28 Other popular TLD's include: ".com," ".org," and ".net." 29 The name
that precedes the TLD is referred to as the second-level domain (SLD).30 For
example, in "McGeorge.edu," "McGeorge" would be classified as the SLD, while
19. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344.1 (West Supp. 2001) (defining "deceased personality" as any person who
died after January 1, 1915, and whose name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness has commercial value at the
time of their death).
20. Marcus J. Millet, Same Game in a New Domain-Same Trademark Issues on the Internet, 198 N.J. LAW
32, 32-33 (1999); G. Gervaise Davis Ill, Internet Domain Names and Trademarks: Recent Developments in
Domestic and International Disputes, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601, 603 (1999).
21. See generally Luke A. Walker, ICANN'S Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 15
BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 289, 291-92 (2000) (detailing the history of the Internet and its structure); Millet, supra note
20, at 33 (explaining the basic structure of the Internet); Golinveaux, supra note 12, at 642 (describing how
computers communicate through the Internet).
22. Millet, supra note 20, at 33; Golinveaux, supra note 12, at 642.
23. Walker, supra note 21, at 291-92.
24. Davis, supra note 20, at 604. McGeorge.edu and Yahoo.com are an example of simple domain names.
25. Elizbeth R. Martin, "Too Famous to Live Long!" The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act Sets








".edu" would remain the TLD.3" So, when a user types "McGeorge.edu" into their
Internet "browser ' 32 program, the computer first looks into the ".edu" TLD, and then
finds the "McGeorge" SLD within the ".edu" TLD and supplies the data contained
therein to the user.33
Organizations called "registrars" are responsible for registering and keeping
track of the domain names within each TLD.34 Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) was
the only registrar for SLD's within the ".com" TLD until June 7, 1999, and remains
the largest registrar for the ".com" TLD today.35 Registrars provide domain names
on a first come, first served basis. 36 The registrar also does not search the federal
government's list of registered trademarks during any part of the application
process. 37 Domain pages are available to anybody with enough money to pay the
required yearly fee. Registering a domain name through NSI typically costs between
$35 and $40 annually.38 NSI even offers a 50% discount if domain names are
registered in bulk.39 The only limiting factor on the registration of a domain name
is that it cannot be identical to a previously registered domain name.40 The registrar
does not normally check to see if a domain name is confusingly similar to another
domain name or mark.4'
42The desire for a domain name to be identical to a company's trademark, or a
celebrity's name, is twofold. First, simply typing a name into a browser program is
the quickest way to access a website, so it is advantageous to companies and
individuals for its simplicity and speed.43 Secondly, using "search engines," which
match search terms with website key words, to find a particular company or persons
web page can yield hundreds of other similar sites that may confuse or distract the
potential customer from accessing the intended website. 44 This may cause a
significant loss in the number of visitors, or potential customers to the intended
31. Walker, supra note 21, at 292-94.
32. See Millet, supra note 20, at 33 (defining browser as a program that sends a query to another computer,
by locating it on the Internet through the appropriate domain name, and retrieving the data contained therein).
33. Walker, supra note 21, at 292-94.
34. See Millet, supra note 20, at 33 (describing the process of registering domain names on the Internet).
35. Id.; Martin, supra note 25, at 805.
36. Millet, supra note 20, at 33.
37. Jeffrey J. Look, The Virtual Wild, Wild West (WWW): Intellectual Property Issues in Cyberspace-
Trademarks, Service Marks, Copyrights, and Domain Names, 22 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L.J. 49, 60 (1999).
38. Network Solutions homepage, Web Address Registration available at
http://www.networksolutions.conrcatalog/domainname (last visited July 14,2000) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
39. See id. (indicating that a request for registration of over 100 domain names qualifies for a bulk discount).
40. Millet, supra note 20, at 33.
41. See id. (discussing how NS1 does not discriminate against domain names that are nearly identical to other
companys' domain names).
42. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1997) (defining a trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown").
43. Golinveaux, supra note 12, at 643.
44. Id.
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website. When users type in a specific domain name, they anticipate finding the
page that pertains to the personal name or business name that was entered. 5
Therefore, if a cybersquatter's page is accessed instead of the intended page, a user
may give up their search due to the hassle of finding the intended page.
Cybersquatters come in a variety of flavors. The most notable form of
cybersquatting is the registration of someone else's trademark as a domain name.46
Other types include registering a misspelling of a trademark as a domain name,47
registering someone's mark under an alternative TLD, registering another's
trademark as part of a larger domain name,48 registering a celebrity's name as a
domain name,49 or registering a competitor or adversary's name or mark and
publicizing another cause or product.50 While all of these forms of cybersquattering
can impose a different degree and type of nuisance for the trademark holder or
celebrity, they are all dealt with under the same set of laws.51
HI. EXISTING LAW
Under existing law, an individual or corporation has several legal remedies to
resolve a dispute with a cybersquatter. California provides some protection under
the Unfair Practices Act52 and the federal government provides protection to
trademark holders and famous individuals through the Lanham Act.53
45. See Will Lee, Hits and Misses, ENT. WKLY, July 21, 2000, at 14 (reporting that the company who owns
"survivor.com," Survivor Software, has had an increase of Internet traffic from 600 to 80,000 visitors, due to the
popularity of the TV show Survivor); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1045 (9th Cir. 1999).
46. See Borgman, supra note 2, at 266-67 (2000) (listing the various forms ofcybersquatting). For example,
where a cybersquatter registers the name of a popular electronics company's trademark and attempts to sell the
domain name back to the mark holder. Id.; Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that just such
an activity constituted trademark dilution).
47. See Toys "R" Us Inc. v. Abir, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1944, 1949 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) (holding that the spelling of
a domain as "toysareus.com" to sell toys to foreign markets was sufficient to constitute infringement and dilution
of the Toys "R" Us registered trademark).
48. See Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166-68 (C.D. Cal 1998)
(concluding that the domain name "Bally sucks" did not infringe or dilute the plaintiff's register trademark).
49. See Website Operator Sues Julia Roberts in Domain Dispute, available at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-
1005-200-2091821.html?tag=st.ne.ron.lthd.ni (last visited on June 16, 2000) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (discussing a suit brought by the domain holder of "Juliaroberts.com" on June 13, 2000 alleging that Julia
Roberts is interfering with the exclusive operation of his website, and seeking to prevent the forced surrender of the
website to Julia Roberts).
50. See Borgman, supra note 2, at 266-67 (listing the "various forms ofcybersquatting"); see also OBH, Inc.
v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 197-98 (W.D. N.Y. 2000) (enjoining the defendant, domain holder,
from using the plaintiff's trademark as a domain name to post disparaging remarks about the plaintiff's business).
51. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West Supp. 2000).
52. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000 et. seq. (West 1997).
53. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West Supp. 2000).
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A. California Law
California law provides that any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or
practices and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising constitutes unfair
competition. 4 The remedies available include civil penalties55 or injunctive relief,
demanding the relinquishment of the domain name.56
California's trademark dilution and infringement laws and the federal trademark
laws, discussed below, are applied identically.57 Due to the parallel structure of the
statutes they are both susceptible to the same criticism as the pre-ACPA law, as
discussed below.
B. Federal Law (The Lanham Act)
Prior to the enactment of the Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA) in 1999, a trademark holder had two methods to attack a cybersquatter.58
The trademark holder could claim that the cybersquatter was infringing 59 or
diluting60 their mark.6 Both of these options, however, could potentially cost a
trademark holder thousands of dollars in attorney's fees.62 Because of this reality,
many cybersquatters used this as leverage to coax a company into buying the
domain name instead of prosecuting the case.63
1. Infringement
Generally, when claiming infringement of a trademark, the primary issues are
whether the plaintiff's trademark is valid and whether the alleged infringer's mark
is confusingly similar to a previously registered trademark. 64 Resolution of a case
involving a cybersquatter generally does not entail the same type of analysis
required in an infringement suit. Since a cybersquatter does not necessarily use the
54. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997).
55. Id. § 17536 (West 1997).
56. Id. § 17535 (West 1997).
57. See Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prod., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1074 (C.D. Cal 1998)
(stating that California state law regarding trademark dilution is subject to the same analysis as a federal dilution
claim-whether the use of the mark is likely to cause confusion).
58. See Look, supra note 37, at 64 (describing various modes of dealing with a cybersquatter).
59. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
60. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (1997 & Supp. 2000) (amending
the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
61. Look, supra note 37, at 64.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 1988) (listing six factors to
be used in determining the likelihood of confusion: "1) the strength or weakness of the marks; 2) similarity in
appearance, sound, and meaning; 3) the class of goods in question; 4) the marketing channels; 5) evidence of actual
confusion; and 6) evidence of the intention of [the] defendant in selecting and using the alleged infringing name").
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domain name in any commercial manner, proving consumer confusion is difficult,
if not impossible, since no goods were actually sold or advertised on the web page.65
The web page is in essence merely being held inactive.66
2. Dilution
Due to the difficulties associated with infringement claims, many courts have
instead analyzed cybersquatter cases under a dilution theory.67 Unlike infringement,
where the use of the mark or name has to be in direct competition or other mode of
consumer confusion occurs, a dilution theory requires the distinctive quality of the
famous mark to be diluted by the presence of another mark.68
To establish dilution of a mark the plaintiff must show: 1) the mark was famous;
2) the mark was famous prior to the defendant's use; and 3) that the defendant's
commercial use of a mark lessens the mark's capacity to identify and distinguish the
plaintiff's goods and services.69 The federal trademark dilution provisions provide
that only injunctive relief is available to the victim, unless the diluter "willfully
intended" to dilute the mark, at which point damages become available.7 °
Drawing the connection between the registration of a domain name and loss of
a mark's ability to distinguish the mark holder's goods and services is a somewhat
illogical process.7 1 Nevertheless, in Panavision International, L.P v. Toeppen,72
where Mr. Toeppen registered the "panavision.com" domain name, a name identical
to Panavision's registered trademark, with the intent of selling the domain name to
Panavision, the court concluded that the registered domain name diluted
Panavision's mark.73 Toeppen's intent to sell the domain name to Panavision
constituted a commercial use of Panavision's trademark.74 Therefore, it did not
matter that Mr. Toeppen did not attach any products or services to the domain
name.75 His attempt to sell the domain name in and of itself constituted a
commercial use and was sufficient to find dilution of Panavision's mark.76 By not
65. See Joel Voelzke, New Cybersquatting Law Gives Trademark Owners Powerful New Weapons Against
Domain Name Pirates, 17 COMPUTER LAW. 3 (2000) (describing the problems faced by attorneys prior to the
enactment of the ACPA).
66. Id.
67. E.g., Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324-27.
68. Look, supra note 37, at 71.
.69. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 1998); Toys "R" Us Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1949.
70. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 1998).
71. See Borgman, supra note 2, at 267 (demonstrating the problem of trying to apply the federal laws of
infringement and dilution in cases involving cybersquatters, such as Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316 (9th Cir. 1998)).
72. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
73. Id. at 1327.
74. Id. at 1325.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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determining whether Panavision's mark was tarnished77 or blurred,78 which is
traditionally required, the Panavision court in essence, created a new form of
dilution.79 This modification of the federal Anti-Dilution Act has been criticized by
some as too much of a reach for the intended meaning of commercial use. 80 These
problems, along with the increasing sophistication of cybersquatter tactics, 81 were
addressed by Congress with the enactment the ACPA in 1999.82
3. Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
The ACPA creates an explicit cause of action to deal with cybersquatters. 83 It
provides protection from individuals who, with a bad faith intent, register or traffic
in domain names that are confusingly similar to already existing distinctive marks,
or are dilutive of pre-existing famous marks.84 The ACPA also provides limited
protection from cybersquatters who attempt to register a domain name using the
"personal name" of an individual. 85 The statute provides nine non-exclusive factors
to determine whether bad faith is present.86 The ACPA also creates new remedies
to deal with cybersquatting.87 Some amendments allow a court to grant injunctive
and monetary relief,88 and others allow for statutory damages instead of actual
damages.89 In addition to these new remedies, the ACPA also provides for in rem
jurisdiction in the judicial district where the registrar is located.90
In order to encourage growth and promote responsibility on the part of the
registrars, the ACPA provides virtual immunity to registrars who cooperate with the
provisions of the Act. 91
77. See Diane K. Wong, Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 245, 248 (2000)
(defining tarnishment as the association of an inferior product with a famous trademark thereby injuring the
reputation of the trademark holder).
78. See id. (defining blurring as the use of a famous mark which leads to consumer confusion as to the
association of the original trademark and the goods attached thereto).
79. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25-77 (2000).
80. See id. (critiquing the application of traditional dilution laws to the Internet and cybersquatters);
Borgman, supra note 2, at 267 ("It is difficult to understand how the mere registration of a domain name would
constitute 'use' of a mark sufficient to create a likelihood of confusion.").
81. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that
many cybersquatters are careful not to offer the sale of domain names in a way that "might implicate liability under
existing trademark dilution law.").
82. 15 U.S.C.A. § 43(d) (West 2000).
83. See Copyright, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 505, 512 (2000) (detailing background information on the
ACPA).
84. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West 2000).
85. Id. § 1129(a) (West 2000).
86. See id. § 1 125(d)(1)(B) (West 2000) (listing nine factors that are nearly identical to the factors used in
the Chapter 218 described below).
87. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(a) (West Supp. 2000); id. § 1117 (West Supp. 2000).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 1117(d) (West Supp. 2000).
90. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2000).
91. Id. § 1114(2)(D)(iii) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
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When the domain name is registered in an individual's name, a different set of
standards apply.92 The cybersquatter must have registered a domain name that is
identical or confusingly similar to the name of another living person with the
"specific intent" of selling the domain name to the rightful owner, or to a third party
for profit.93 An exception applies for copyright holders and licensees who use the
name in relation to works of authorship, and where a copyright holder intends to sell
the domain name "in conjunction with the lawful exploitation of the work,"
providing that there is no contractual prohibition between the parties.94 Therefore,
as long as the cybersquatter includes a photograph, drawing, sound recording, or
other copyrightable work on the website, they have not violated the ACPA.95
C. The Problem: Determining Subjective Intent
Intent requirements differ significantly when a court is dealing with a trademark
as compared to a personal name.96 To find a person liable under the ACPA, the
subjective intent of the cybersquatter must be proven.97 Therefore, unless the
cybersquatter makes an overt act demonstrating a motive for commercial profit, they
cannot be found liable.98 This enables a cybersquatter to register hundreds of domain
names of famous people or of people with a strong chance of becoming famous,
such as amateur athletes, and wait for the individual(s) to make an offer after they
learn that their names are already registered. Also, no protection is given to the heirs
of deceased celebrities from the effects of a cybersquatter.99 Therefore, a
cybersquatter can either wait patiently for a celebrity to come to them, or in the case
of a deceased celebrity, she can be more aggressive and solicit payment from the
estate of the celebrity.
92. MCCARTHY, supra note 79, at § 25-80.
93. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1129(1)(A) (West Supp. 2000).
94. Id. § 1129(1)(B) (West Supp. 2000).
95. See Borgman, supra note 2, at 267 (describing the exceptions to the protection of personal names under
the ACPA).
96. See MCCARTHY, supra note 79, at § 25-80 (comparing the laws protecting trademarks and personal
names from cybersquatters).
97. See Voelzke, supra note 65, at 3 (discussing how a person with an identical name could still be found
liable as long as it could be proven that she had the specific intent to sell the domain name to another person for
profit).
98. See ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1319, at 4 (June 20, 2000)
(revealing the practical difficulties in utilizing the federal ACPA).
99. See Borgman, supra note 2, at 274-75 (concluding that the specific intent requirement, exclusions, and
lack of protection for deceased celebrities, render the law "toothless").
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IV. CHAPTER 218
To protect personal names from cybersquatters, California has added Chapter
218 to the Business and Professions Code.' °° Chapter 218 enhances the federal
ACPA by: 1) no longer requiring proof of specific intent to profit in order to find
liability; and 2) extending protection to the names of living persons and deceased
personalities, not just to persons who were alive and famous at the time the domain
name was registered.'0 ' Chapter 218 provides that a violation of the Unfair
Competition Act 10 2 occurs when any person, who, without consent, and with a bad
faith intent, registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name, that is identical or
confusingly similar to the personal name of a living person or a deceased
personality.I°3 A violation of the Unfair Competition Act provides that a violator
may be enjoined from using the domain name and ordered to transfer ownership to
the rightful owner,1°4 and civil penalties, including lawyers fees may be levied
against the violating party. 1
05
The determination of "bad faith" is made by applying nine non-exclusive
factors, which include: (1) the alleged cybersquatter's intellectual property rights in
the domain name, if any; (2) the extent the person or deceased celebrity name is
used in the domain name; (3) the bona fide prior use of the domain; (4) the existence
of a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the name on the website located at the
alleged cybersquatters domain name; (5) the intent of the alleged cybersquatter to
divert consumers from finding the appropriate web page or the intent to tarnish the
person's or deceased celebrity's name by creating confusion as to who is the true
source of the web page; (6) the existence of any offer made by the alleged
cybersquatter to sell or transfer the domain to the rightful owner or third party and
the lack of intent to use the domain name in any bona fide manner; (7) the extent to
which false or misleading contact information was given when applying for the
registration of the domain name; (8) the possession of multiple domain names that
are identical or confusingly similar to other persons or deceased celebrity's names;
and (9) the existence of consent from the rightful owner.2 6 Similar to the federal
ACPA, immunity is provided for domain name registrars who cooperate with the
provisions of this law.'07
Chapter 218 also provides an exception to protect innocent parties from being
sued for merely expressing themselves on domain names that are identical or
confusingly similar to a celebrity's name. If the name registered as a domain name
100. CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17525, 17526, 17527, 17528 (enacted by Chapter 218).
101. Id. § 17525(a) (enacted by Chapter 218).
102. Id. § 17200 (West 1997).
103. Id. § 17525(a) (enacted by Chapter 218).
104. Id. §§ 17535, 17203, 17070 (West 1997).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 17526 (enacted by Chapter 218).
107. Id. § 17525(c) (enacted by Chapter 218).
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is connected to a creative piece of work, "including but not limited to, fictional or
non-fictional entertainment, and dramatic, literary, audiovisual, or musical works"
the registering party will not be liable.'18
V. ANALYSIS
With the enactment of Chapter 218, the California Legislature is seeking to
protect one of California's greatest "natural" assets, Hollywood. By extending
protection from cybersquatters to celebrities and their benefactors, the Legislature
is protecting the economic future of many young, yet to be famous individuals, and
an ever growing population of deceased personalities, whose heirs are dependent on
the value of the personality's name.
1°9
Chapter 218 may inadvertently limit the expression of some good faith fans
though. By relaxing the intent requirement from a specific intent to profit to merely
using it as one of the nine non-exclusive factors in determining bad faith intent,
there is a possibility that some fan's websites will be either bullied, or forced by the
courts to relinquish their domain name." 0 This seems to contradict the popular belief
that the Internet is an open media for freedom of expression. However, this freedom
of expression must be balanced with the ever increasing financial power that the
Internet holds.' By allowing Internet users to register and use domain names
predatorily, many people whose livelihood are dependant on the marketability of
their name will be adversely affected." 2 Also, exclusions set out in Chapter 218
which provide immunity for web pages used for works of creative authorship help
to ensure that freedom of expression will be protected.1l3 With the application of the
nine factors discussed above, and the exclusion of works of authorship, true good
faith fans will be free to share their opinions on certain famous personalities, and
celebrities will be able to utilize the Internet as a financial tool.
VI. CONCLUSION
The enactment of Chapter 218 provides a remedy to citizens who are the victims
of the predatory actions of cybersquatters, hoping to gain wealth by simply
108. Id. § 17525(b) (enacted by Chapter 218).
109. Letter from Catherine York, Director of Government Relations of the Screen Actors Guild, to Senator
John Burton (Mar. 1, 2000) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
110. Mayhew, supra note 6, at El.
111. See John Dorschner, www.cashingin.com, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 12, 2000 (discussing the auctioning of
domain names).
112. Eric J. Sinrod, Jeffery W. Reyna and Barak D. Jolish, Evicting Cybersquatters, UPSIDE TODAY, June 19,
2000 available at http://upsidetoday.com/texis/mvm/story?id=387243dbO (last visited June 19, 2000) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (evaluating the implementation of the ACPA and it effects on the Internet).
113. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17525(b) (enacted by Chapter 218).
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registering another person's name.114 By enabling the court to determine if a bad
faith intent is present, instead of having to prove that the cybersquatter had a specific
intent to profit, the victims of cybersquatters now have a much greater chance at
receiving a favorable decision in California courts.
114. See Letter from Kim Allman, Director, State Government Affairs, Recording Industry Association of
America, to Senator John Burton (Apr. 20, 2000) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (supporting SB 1319's
protective powers); Letter from Vans Stevenson, Senior Vice President, State Legislative Affairs, Motion Picture
Association of America, Inc., to Senator Adam Schiff (Apr. 17, 2000) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(commending the appropriateness of SB 1319, and its ability to protect celebrities from cybersquatters).
